

TAB 4

The Failure to Defend Defense

Weinberger and Casey Fail to Strike the Proper Military Balance

by Anthony H. Cordesman and Benjamin F. Schemmer

Even in the best economic climate, defense must compete with other uses of public funds. In a major recession, every defense dollar must be shown to be necessary. This is partly a matter of efficiency and effectiveness: the American people must be-

lieve that their tax dollars are being spent wisely. It is also, however, a matter of convincing the American people that a strong defense is necessary to meet the Soviet threat. This is not simply a matter of showing that Soviet forces are increasing in size and capability, it is

a matter of showing that planned US force improvements are a well-judged response to the trends in the Soviet threat.

For the last decade, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence have published comparisons of US and Soviet forces as part of the annual budget cycle to support the President's proposed defense budget. The Defense Secretary has explained the strategic balance, the trend in theater nuclear forces, the trend in conventional forces, and the trends in the NATO and Warsaw Pact Alliances, while the Director of Central Intelligence has published detailed dollar cost estimates of US and Soviet defense spending.

These data have shaped the Reagan Administration's buildup of US forces. The comparisons of US and Soviet forces have furnished the essential rationale for increased defense spending, and a critical perspective on the size of the US defense budget and the adequacy of US forces. Although many readers may not realize it, most of the statistical and graphic data that shaped the SALT II debate, and many of the qualifying words necessary to give such numbers meaning, came from the *Annual Report* of the Secretary of Defense and the *Military Posture* statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Virtually all of the data on the inadequacy of US forces and defense expenditures that President Reagan campaigned on came from these sources. They underpin every reputable work on the military balance and on US and Soviet defense expenditures.

Omitting the Facts from the Secretary's FY84 Annual Report

The merits of providing as much data on the balance as possible should be obvious to a conservative Administration which won election through its use of such data, which advocates a strong defense, which now faces a massive defense budget battle in the Congress, which faces an even greater battle over arms control, and which must try to persuade its allies to maintain their defense spending in the face of a world recession. The Reagan Administration seemed to understand this when it wrote its first series of defense posture statements.

It published more statistical material on the balance in FY83 than any previous Administration.

Somewhere along the line, however, things have gone astray. As Table One shows, Secretary Weinberger has re-

TABLE ONE

DELETING THE US-SOVIET MILITARY BALANCE

A Comparison of the FY1984 Posture Statements With Past Years

(Number of Tables and Estimates of the Balance by Document and Category)

Type of Balance or Comparison	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84
Secretary of Defense's Annual Report						
Strategic	1	1	14	—	1	—
Theater Nuclear	—	—	1	1	—	—
NATO/Pact	—	—	4	1	—	—
Asian/Global	—	—	—	—	—	—
Land Balance	—	—	1	—	—	—
Air Balance	—	—	1	—	—	—
Naval Balance	—	—	1	1	1	—
Arms Transfers	—	—	—	1	1	1
Equipment Production	—	—	—	—	—	1
Defense Expenditures	3	—	—	2	6	(3)
Manpower	1	—	—	—	—	—
Economic/Military Strength	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	14	1	32	6	9	2
Does not include four tables which are duplicates or copies of previous year's data.						
Joint Chiefs' Annual Military Posture Statement						
Strategic	15	—	4	28	5	1
Theater Nuclear	—	—	1	1	—	(1)
NATO/Pact	1	—	9	19	18	3
Asian/Global	—	—	—	—	—	(1)
Land Balance	5	—	4	4	7	1
Air Balance	6	—	—	3	—	1
Naval Balance	5	—	6	10	1	—
Arms Transfers	—	—	—	—	—	1
R&D, Technology, and	—	—	—	—	—	—
Equipment Production	—	—	—	—	—	—
Defense Expenditures	—	2	—	—	—	—
Military Manpower	1	—	—	1	1	—
Economic/Military	—	—	—	—	—	—
CBW	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	32	2	24	50	60	9
Grand Total	46	3	56	56	69	11

NOTE: Figures in parentheses in FY84 column indicate data are a repetition of last year's data or outdated information published in other sources which does not reflect the impact of Reagan Administration programs.

A given table may contain information on more than one category. All categories are counted in the above chart except regional surveys.

Does not include portions of text with statistical information. If these were included, rather than simply tables and charts, the count for information on the balance in the years before FY84 would often be nearly twice that shown.

moved virtually all of the useful data on the balance from the Defense Department's two main defense policy and budget statements. Even Table One understates just how much material has been censored in FY84, or is presented in an inadequate or potentially misleading form. With almost Orwellian timing, the Secretary of Defense has made "1984" the year in which the truth about the balance is missing from his defense of the nation's defense budget.

Canceling CIA Public Reporting on the Soviet Military Budget and Activities in the Third World



Secretary Weinberger has not acted alone. William Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, has killed the CIA's annual estimate of Soviet defense spending. The Agency will no longer publish its *Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and US Defense Activities*, perhaps the most quoted work it has ever issued. CIA reporting will evidently be confined to the release of selected data to the Congress and press, although in a form that will lack sufficient analytic detail and backup to be convincing in the face of intelligent questions or criticism. According to an official CIA spokesman, the Director has done this as part of a general policy of eliminating all public CIA reporting on military matters and Soviet forces.

He has also eliminated the Agency's annual estimate of Soviet military and economic assistance to Third World countries and its reporting on the number of Soviet military and economic advisors overseas. This information used to be published in a document entitled *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries*.

The title of this report is so esoteric that its importance may not be obvious, but it was the only useful source of data on the number of Soviet bloc and Communist advisors in foreign countries, the number of foreign military trained in the Soviet bloc, and the size of Soviet economic and military aid to Third World nations. Without it, there is no reliable source of data on the number of Cuban, Soviet, East German, or PRC military in nations like South Yemen or Ethiopia or on the intensity of the Soviet effort to target given Third World nations.

The same CIA spokesman made it clear that the Director's new policy applies to far more than these two periodicals. When asked whether the CIA would issue any further statistical or analytical data of any kind on threat military forces, he replied, "Nothing."

Some lower-level CIA staff have raised some more serious issues. Although there is no way of confirming their views, some feel that the reporting on Soviet defense may have been eliminated because it disclosed serious analyt-



ic problems and uncertainties in the CIA effort in this area. One CIA analyst also raised the issue of whether the report on Soviet expenditures was being dropped because it would disclose a leveling out or drop in the rate of growth in Soviet defense spending and equipment production over the last two years, although he noted that this conclusion was "controversial" and scarcely reduced the rationale for increases in the US defense budget.

The Surviving Facts Cannot Defend Defense

This leaves only four, far less significant, official sources that provide meaningful data on the threat and military balance. Even if these sources are not buried under the current wave of censorship, they are scarcely adequate substitutes for the information that has now been eliminated:

- The first source is the annual report of the Under Secretary of Defense for

Research and Engineering, and is called the *DoD Program for Research, Development, and Acquisition*. This statement has provided useful comparisons of US vs. Soviet and Western vs. Soviet bloc investment, R&D, technology, and production in recent years.

It has not, however, compared total force capabilities. It provided few insights into the balance of forces by which Americans can measure the adequacy of their defense budget. It compared budget inputs—how much the US invests in strategic forces or general purpose forces, for instance, compared to the USSR. But it told almost nothing about budget output—what impact those relative investments have had or will have on the military balance.

Moreover, the first printed version of this year's R&D report contained virtually no information on the array of new systems which the Soviets' past R&D investment has produced, about which the US Defense Department has said little or nothing officially, but on which

Western intelligence sources have now collected *hard* evidence. These include:

- Three new cruise missiles;
- Two "families" of fighter variants, including four or five fighter and attack aircraft;
- Two new strategic bombers;
- A successor to the mobile SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile (which is still being deployed at a rate of over four a month);
- Three new ICBM intercontinental ballistic missiles, two of them apparently already in flight test;
- An impressive new torpedo;
- A new T-80 tank (which a *New York Times* op-ed piece last November headlined as being "nonexistent");
- A new Il-76 Airborne Warning and Control System with the NATO code name "Mainstay," replacing the first generation Tu-114 Moss.

At press time for this issue, senior Pentagon officials were considering whether or not to add an addendum to the R&D report pointing out some of these new developments. One such official expressed genuine surprise that the version already printed contained almost no information about them.

- The second source is the statements issued by the Service Chiefs and Secretaries when they first testify on their budgets. These have had virtually no substantive content on the threat in recent years. They used to include an occasionally useful table comparing production rates of combat aircraft, tanks, or ships; but this year, the Army and Air Force statements have *no* such data.

Defense Secretary Weinberger did release the charts reproduced here comparing 1974-1982 production of selected weapons and annual Soviet production compared to DoD's FY84 budget request when he unveiled his budget to the Pentagon press corps. But there was no explanation of the data, and it differs markedly from the last data Weinberger provided on Soviet production rates in his widely publicized September 1981 pamphlet *Soviet Military Power*. That document showed Russia producing an average of 2,700 tanks a year between 1976 and 1980, compared with the 1,920 a year in Weinberger's latest 1974-1982 comparison, a difference of either 29% or 40% (depending on which number is used as a base). For major surface combatant ships, the 1981 data showed average annual Soviet production of over 11 a year; Weinberger's latest chart showed over nine a year. Weinberger's 1981 data showed the Russians producing an average of 1,260 combat tactical aircraft a year, with production on the increase from 1978 to 1980; but his latest chart shows only 680 a year, a discrepancy either of 46% or of 85%. The figures on Soviet submarine construction differed from an average of about 10 a year in

1981's estimate to roughly 12 in this year's.

For more than one reporter, the discrepancies raised two questions: Was American intelligence that inaccurate or uncertain? Or, had the Soviets dramatically curtailed production of military hardware in the past two years? The answer turned out to be neither: Weinberger's public affairs office finally explained that the latest numbers were intended to reflect only what the Soviet arsenal has been producing for its *own* forces, and excluded ships, tanks, aircraft, and submarines produced for export. Most reporters, apparently, were too confused by it all, or skeptical of the data, to report any of the numbers. Thus, what little comparative threat data Weinberger had provided to support his record FY84 budget request went unreported to the American public.

In contrast to the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries, Navy Secretary John Lehman included four very informative paragraphs in his FY84 report to Congress on new Soviet naval systems and deployments. But neither his statement nor the Chief of Naval Operations' provided any assessment of the new naval balance.

Thus, the Service budget statements this year fail to give the taxpayer any feel for how much of a gap in equipment or forces their record budget requests are designed to bridge, or of how much better America might stand against its principal adversary even if Congress were to approve those budgets in full.

- The third source is ACDA's *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, but the data in this document are two or more years old. The 1982 edition, for instance, only reports on "1970-1979." The document fails to provide any useful information on current trends and programs, and has severe definitional and reporting problems. The data on the numbers of weapons transferred and the data on the dollar value of weapons transfers never seem to track. It does not provide a breakout of weapons transfers by year or country, and gives no picture of the number of civilian or uniformed advisors in a given country. It badly needs expansion and updating to become more relevant, and is largely of interest to historians and those poor journeyman reporters forced to write this year's story about the evils of arms sales and "merchants of death."

- The final source does not provide any data on the balance, but rather a one-dimensional view of the threat. This source is a new document called *Soviet Military Power*, released by Secretary of Defense Weinberger late in 1981. That first edition was designed to dramatize the threat in Sunday supplement terms, and failed to present the threat in perspective. It provided little useful qualitative data on the threat forces it de-

scribed, and little new statistical information—notwithstanding some Pentagon claims that it had involved a "massive" declassification effort and that about 35% of the information in it had never been made public before.

A new version of *Soviet Military Power* was being readied for release as this issue of *AFJ* went to press. Pentagon intelligence officials have been working overtime to ready it for printing yet still seemed very uncertain of how much new data it might divulge.

Whatever its revelations, the document will still be one-dimensional: it will be about Soviet forces, and thus cannot substitute for the data on the military balance that used to form such an important part of the Secretary of Defense's *Annual Report* and of the JCS *Military Posture* statements. While the document will be useful in telling American taxpayers something new about the threat which prompts President Reagan's \$274.1-billion FY84 defense budget request, it will not tell America how that money will help *meet* the threat.

The US needs to show how the threat relates to US and allied capabilities, and present the threat in terms that will convince moderates in the US, Europe, Asia, and the Third World. The Soviets have retaliated with a propaganda document on the US "threat" entitled *Whence the Threat to Peace*. The second edition of this document has just been issued by the Soviet Ministry of Defense, and it is a virtual parody of *Soviet Military Power* down to the slick photos, simple graphics, and punchline maps. It is a grim warning that propaganda can only alienate anyone seeking perspective and objectivity; yet it is the unconverted who must be won over if the FY84 defense budget is to survive the massive cuts Congressmen are now suggesting.

Removing the Balance from the Secretary's FY84 Annual Report

The largest number of deletions occurs in the Secretary's *Annual Report*, reaching a point where DoD and the CIA risk killing 10 years' worth of work to help Congress and the public understand the trends in the military balance. There is no information on the strategic balance or theater nuclear forces of any kind in his FY84 *Annual Report*, although these deeply troubled programs cry out for a rationale. There are no comparisons that would explain his general purpose forces program or his rationale for shifting increased resources into sea power. It gives no information on the changing balance in Asia. It provides no data on the adequacy of our forces in NATO or USCENTCOM or whether our tactical forces can compete with those of the USSR.

What little data on the balance remain in the FY84 *Annual Report* are outdated

or misleading. There are only five sets of data on the balance in the entire document. Three cover US vs. Soviet and Western vs. Warsaw Pact military investment, but all end in 1981. Not only they repeat data released last year, they seem to omit corrections for reductions in Soviet defense activity in late 1981. They give no feel for whether the proposed program will restore any of the past gap between US and Soviet defense expenditures and give no picture of whether the Western Alliance now is doing a better job of competing with the Warsaw Pact.

Military Equipment Production: More Questions Than Answers

The fourth table is simply a different array of the data on US and Soviet military equipment production during "1974-82," which Weinberger gave the Pentagon press corps when he unveiled his budget, and whose discrepancies have already been discussed.

The data do not even track with the FY83 report of the Under Secretary of Defense Research and Engineering. This is revealed by the statistical shifts in the self-propelled artillery data in the FY83 and FY84 documents, which suddenly raised the Soviet advantage in artillery production from 13:1 to 38.1:1, and in a new method of counting other armored vehicles, which raised the Soviet advantage from 5:1 to 7.6:1. While the changes seem to be part of a harmless exercise to refine the data base, they become a problem when the method of analysis is changed.

US and Soviet Arms Sales: Too Little Data on Too Important an Issue

The final table on the balance in the Secretary's FY84 *Annual Report* again covers the period before the Reagan Administration had any impact on the balance, and provides no insight into the need for the FY84 defense budget. It compares US and Soviet arms deliveries to the Third World during 1977-1981, but was originally released last August by the Department of State in Special Report No. 102, *Conventional Arms Transfers in the Third World, 1972-1981*.

Once again, the table runs into definitional and reporting problems that cast the validity of the estimates into doubt, when it should be part of a detailed analysis that could provide a clear case for increased US effort. One table shows that the USSR delivered 7,065 tanks and self-propelled guns to the Third World, while the US delivered 3,200. Similarly, the USSR delivered 9,570 artillery weapons to 3,155 for the US, 2,525 combat aircraft to 955, 11,680 surface-to-air missiles to 7,860, and 910 helicopters to 225.

These figures should be a grim warning to the Congress and the US that our military assistance program is an urgent offset to a systematic expansion of Soviet arms sales, particularly because the USSR is said to have a 20:1 superiority in the number of foreign military trained and in the number of military technicians serving in Third World countries.

Unfortunately, the data do not track with the data which compare US and Soviet arms transfers in billions of dollars in the Joint Chiefs' FY84 *Military Posture* statement. The Joint Chiefs' figures indicate that the US sold almost exactly as many arms to the Third World during 1978-mid-1982 as the USSR, the US selling \$36.3-billion worth to \$38.1-billion worth for the USSR. Even this comparison ignores the fact that the table only counts FMS and MAP sales for the US and all sales for the USSR. If one does not play definitional games, the JCS data clearly indicate that the US sold more arms than the USSR.

Which should anyone believe? Does the USSR really produce two to three times as many modern weapons for the same dollar? Is the Soviet economy really two to three times more efficient than that of the US? Well, no, but the conflicts in US arms trade statistics have only begun.

Although estimates of the trade during all of 1982 were available when the JCS *Military Posture* report was written, the data in the *Military Posture* statement cover only the part of FY82 that disguises a massive bulge in US sales. There is also no indication that such arms deliveries (what is included is never defined) have nothing to do with the total US military assistance program. This is made all too clear on the same page of the *Military Posture* statement that shows arms delivery data. The Joint Chiefs' table shows that the US delivered only \$4.5-billion worth of arms during the first six months of FY82, but the text indicates that the FY82 FMS program totaled nearly \$22-billion.

Both the Secretary's and Chiefs' figures seem to conflict with the Defense Security Assistance Agency's statistics on FMS sales deliveries, published in the 1981 edition of *Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts*. The DSAA data show that the US delivered \$8.3-billion worth of FMS and MAP sales in FY81, vs. the \$4.9-billion reported for the same year in the JCS table. This same document shows that the US had over \$40-billion worth of undelivered FMS and MAP agreements in 1981, long before \$22-billion was added in the FY82 program. Without the supporting text to explain the conflicts between these figures, one is forced to believe that the USSR gives its clients six to 12 times as many weapons per "dollar." This is scarcely the argument the

US should be making to its allies.

Finally, the risk of presenting oversimplified "punchline" data is illustrated by the fact that the only way the Secretary of Defense can estimate that there are 20 times as many Soviet military technicians serving in Third World countries as US military technicians is to (a) ignore all US civilian personnel performing the same functions and (b) count the entire Soviet invasion force in Afghanistan.

"Thugs"? Yes. "Invaders"? Yes. "Technicians"? Hardly.

This is no way to persuade anyone to fund military assistance, or to persuade the new Congress that the US is not overselling arms. It is also no way to persuade the Third World that the threat is being driven by the USSR.

Not only is seven-eighths of the world more interested in *this* aspect of the balance than any other, virtually all political and military confrontations between the US and USSR now occur in areas primarily affected by arms sales, advisors, training, and proxy forces.

What is needed is a net assessment that builds on documents like the State Department's *Conventional Arms Transfers in the Third World, 1972-1981*, issued last August, and the very report that the Director of Central Intelligence has eliminated, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries*, last issued in October of 1980.

The Lack of Balance in the FY84 Military Posture Statement

The omissions in the FY84 *Military Posture* statement of the Joint Chiefs are less obvious. There is some current information on the balance. These data are shown in Tables Two, Three and Four of this article. They are scarcely of much use trying to track with data published in previous years, however, and may actually end up disguising the absence of more useful information from the Congress, press, and public.

In fairness to the Chiefs, these data are not what several wanted. One Service Chief came within the thin edge of refusing to endorse the document for its lack of substance. It is also obvious that much of the data on the US-Soviet and NATO-Warsaw Pact balance was deleted at the last minute. The ground, naval, and air tables all bear headings that indicate they should cover 1982 and 1988, but the 1988 data were deleted just before press time.

In fact, the deletion came so late in the process that one senior OSD official and at least one Service Chief had no idea that the data had been removed from the final edition. They were even removed from the Secret version of the *Military Posture* report provided to key Congressional committees who have to decide on the FY84 defense budget.

The Conventional Land and Air Balance: Persuading Congress and Our Allies Not to Cut Their Forces

Nothing is provided on the land and air balances except the point estimates shown in Table Three. These do nothing to flag the dangers to the West that are inherent in further cuts to conventional forces. If anything, these tables and the supporting text in the FY84 *Annual Report* and *Military Posture* statement encourage the feeling that the fighting in Lebanon and the Falklands, and in the Iran-Iraq War, has demonstrated the superiority of Western tactical weapons.

The key uncertainties raised by the T-80, the BDRM-2, and the rest of the next generation of Soviet armored fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, new Soviet artillery weapons, and new Soviet antitank and antiair guided missiles are virtually or entirely ignored. The same is true of the fact that the Warsaw Pact has a whole new generation of fighters in active production or on the edge of production. The impact of the Su-25, Su-27, MiG-29, and a new Soviet AWACs is not portrayed or discussed.

There is no conceivable point in concealing the Soviet threat from the USSR, or in hiding the fact that US intelligence quickly detects such systems. There is vast merit in showing the American people and our allies the trends in the balance, and the fact that the present tactical program is not a needless expenditure in defense, but rather a critical investment in minimal deterrence.

The Naval Balance: Keeping the Shipbuilding Program Afloat

The sparse data on the naval balance follow the same trend. Table Four shows all of the comparisons provided in the FY84 *Military Posture* statement. The good news is that a projection is provided beyond 1982. The bad news is that most of the data in Table Four are misleading and fail to put the need for a strong Navy in perspective.

The data on principal surface combatants show only ship numbers, and not relative displacement. This grossly exaggerates the threat because the Soviet Union has many low-capability ships in this category, and the US does not. Previous editions of the *Military Posture* statement have always been careful to make this point and show both curves.


In contrast, the Navy should have thought long and hard about the curves for naval aircraft trends shown in Table Four. Does it really serve anyone's interest to ignore the Backfire and land-based air threat to US and NATO naval forces? Should air data be presented without showing the missile threat? Does the decline in Soviet forces between 1980 and 1984 really represent the

Table Two The Land-Air Balance

1982 vs 1988 Ground Forces Comparison



1982 vs 1988 Combat Aircraft Comparison*



*Naval Aircraft Included

Source: OJCS, *Military Posture*, FY 1984, Chart 2-5 and Chart 2-6.

trend the US should plan for?

As for the other data in Table Four, there is a serious need to analyze the true amphibious balance, and not publish nonsense numbers based on ship counts. It is the trend in range, performance, and lift capacity over time that counts, and which should be used to help defend the proposals to strengthen USCENTCOM and RDF capabilities. There is a need for similar data on airlift and power projection capabilities in the Persian Gulf, particularly at a time when the force improvement plans may lose momentum because of a recession-induced "oil glut."

Finally, does Table Four really show what the American people need to know about the submarine problem? Do these


urgent the US building program is? Do they give a picture of the changing nature of Soviet capabilities? The answer is obvious. The implied "balance" is far too optimistic.

The Strategic Balance: No Report on Effectiveness or the Vulnerability Gap

The worst of the problems in both posture statements is shown in Table Two. The weapons and delivery system shown for FY84 are the *only* data published on the strategic balance. They tell nothing about the shifts in the vulnerability gap, the impact of the cruise missile, the problems caused by the delay in the M-X program, the timing and im-


Table Three The Naval Balance

1982 vs 1988 Naval Forces Comparison



Principal Surface Combatants


U.S. NAVY
Frigates
Destroyers
Cruisers
Corvettes



AS OF 1 JANUARY 1985

U.S. and Soviet Naval Aircraft Trends

U.S. NAVY
Frigates
Destroyers
Cruisers
Corvettes



AS OF 1 JANUARY 1985

Source: OJCS, *Military Posture*, FY 1984, Chart 2-7, 2-8, and 2-9.

trade-off between deploying the B-1B and the removal of the B-52D from the force structure, and the impact of deactivating the Titan II.

While the Reagan strategic program seems strong and fundamentally sound, it is hard to dismiss the notion that this deletion of information could be a deliberate effort to disguise the fact that the "vulnerability gap" will grow to the point where it might become far worse under the Reagan Administration than was projected under the Carter Administration. The delay in the M-X program, problems in deployment of various cruise missiles, and the timing of the phaseout of Titan II and the B-52D hint that if the Administration had published

the same data as it did in FY83, the projections would be much worse.

This, however, is scarcely a reason not to publish such data. Such a trend is scarcely the fault of the Reagan Administration. It is, if anything, a powerful warning to the Congress and those who would rush into arms control before we are ready. The Department of Defense has simply thrown away a priceless opportunity to explain the need for US strategic force modernization.

It also is not entirely possible to dismiss the issue of fair play. The Reagan Presidential campaign capitalized on the Stealth incident. One only has to imagine what Candidate Reagan would have said if Harold Brown had eliminated the

data on the strategic balance in his election year posture statements that Caspar Weinberger has eliminated from his FY84 posture statements. There is also no hint of the reappraisal—which Weinberger said (in his FY83 *Annual Report*) was underway—"of our methods of assessing the strategic nuclear balance."

The Theater Nuclear Balance: The Need to Inform the Alliance

The situation is just as bad in the case of the theater nuclear balance. This is an area where the Administration desperately needs to state its case and issue a warning. Both the US and NATO need leadership and facts. The West has a broad need to know that the SS-20 has been improved and that a successor is already in testing. It needs to see projections of the trend in SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 deployment. It needs to understand just who it is who is deploying more and more nuclear strike aircraft while the US and NATO are cutting their forces. It needs to see that the Warsaw Pact is building up its nuclear artillery strength while NATO is cutting its short-range forces.

The Joint Chiefs made a first step at this last year. They provided three different estimates of the theater nuclear balance. This year they were only allowed to present one, and the data in this year's *Military Posture* statement are a travesty of what is required. They portray the balance as 0 for US and NATO systems to 581 intermediate-range Soviet systems. This provides no new insights of any kind. Worse, these figures are not supported by any text that helps explain the US analysis of the balance.

This is particularly critical in light of the totally different figures issued by the Soviet Union, the IISS, and US experts. The Soviet Union faces no restraints on propagandizing its view of the balance, as is shown in *Whence the Threat to Peace*, or in altering its numbers at the arms control talks to eliminate large numbers of Soviet systems and count Western systems which have only a marginal nuclear mission at best. Where the JCS counts 0 systems for NATO, the Soviet balance in *Whence the Threat to Peace* counts no systems for the Soviet Union. It instead counts a totally exaggerated 2,200 nuclear artillery weapons and 1,002 US nuclear strike fighters, and projects a fantastic 8,000 nuclear Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles for 1990.

The IISS has improved its counts in recent years, but makes no projections and still severely underestimates the size and trend of the Warsaw Pact thrust. It shows the Pact as having 2,297 warheads available vs. 799 to 1,199 for NATO. Experts like Donald Cotter, who served as the Chief Assistant on nuclear matters to Secretaries Schlesinger, Rumsfeld, and Brown, have pub-

lished convincing estimates that show the Warsaw Pact has a 6:1 advantage in total nuclear delivery systems and a 4:1 advantage in missile systems. Cotter, however, counts a total of 6,985-7,535 warheads for NATO vs. 12,116 for the Warsaw Pact. This is far more warheads than the IISS counts even if one makes maximum allowance for definitional differences.

This situation cannot be dealt with by issuing a few "cartoons," which is how some senior European officials described to *AFJ* the artist's illustration of an SS-20 in Weinberger's 1981 edition of *Soviet Military Power*. They had urged the US to release a photograph of it, so they could show protesters in Europe that the SS-20 threat is a real one.

The Balance and the Need for Hard Truths

There is something curiously alien about what has happened in this year's set of posture statements. One does not have to refer back to the Federalist Papers or John Stuart Mill to realize that one of the fundamental principles of our democracy has always been to tell the public as much as possible, and to let our political system strike the balance between requirements and resources.

Information and truth can be the strongest defense of a strong defense—and are needed most. Solid conservatives like Senator John Tower have, in fact, already pointed this out to the Administration. Senator Tower struck just the right note in a recent op-ed piece in the *Washington Post*: "I have urged the Administration to declassify and release [facts about Soviet military power] to the American public. I am convinced that the better Americans understand the nature of the threat our Nation faces, the better prepared they will be to deal with it."


Whatever the motive behind the deletions of military balance data from this year's posture statements, the results are to deprive the people, Congress, and media of an intelligent explanation of the defense budget they are being asked to support.

There is no alternative source of the information missing from this year's defense reports. Private research groups and other governments depend on open US analysis to provide a meaningful perspective on the balance. No other group has the resources.


Thus, the American intelligence community must take part, to the extent possible within the limits of security, in the debate and discussion of the threat it analyzes. Without that, President Reagan's defense buildup will be crippled by self-inflicted wounds.

Table Four The Strategic Balance

DoD's Projections in FY 1982: Decline



DoD's Projections in FY 1983: Danger



DoD's Non-Projections in FY 1984: Deletion

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

ICBM's					
U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR		
33 TITAN	50-6	304 POSTHORN	254-4		
350 MINUTEMAN II	100-2	240 TRIDENT II	100-2		
250 MINUTEMAN III	50-2	544	350		
1049	50-2				

SLBMs					
U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR		
304 POSTHORN	254-4	DELIVERY VEHICLES	1971		
240 TRIDENT II	100-2	• MISSILES	9483		
544	350	• BOMBERS	378		

BOMBERS					
U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR		
31 B-52D	124				
151 B-52G	100-2				
90 B-57H	100-2				
56 FB-111	100-2				
328					

APPROXIMATE TOTALS					
U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR		
1971	1524				
9483	2248				
378	250				

AS OF 1 JANUARY 1982 DATA

Note: All projections are taken from the OJCS *Military Posture* statement. The curves for FY 1982 are taken from Chart II-2 of the FY 1982 edition. The curves for FY 1983 are taken from Chart II-8 of the FY 1983 edition. The non-curves for FY 1984 are taken from Chart 2-2 of the FY 1984 edition and are the only data in either posture statement.

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